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INTERPRETATION AND DISCLOSURE IN

INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Dudi Schwartz*
This Essay has two goals: one descriptive and one normative.
Descriptively, it explicates the connection between interpretation of
insurance contracts and the Insurer's disclosure duty. Disclosure duties
and interpretationrules constitute a two way street. The interpretationof
insurance contracts by courts, ex post, influences the incentives of
insurance companies to disclose information to consumers, ex ante.
Correspondingly, the scope of ex ante disclosure by insurance companies
impacts the willingness of courts to overwrite insurance contracts by
broadly interpreting provisions to increase the liability of insurance
companies. To illustrate this claim, the Essay discusses the two principal
interpretive tools used by the courts to expand the liability of insurance
companies: the "Interpretation against the Drafter" rule and "The
Reasonable Expectations" test.
Normatively, the Essay proposes a new interpretative model for
interpreting insurance contracts. The model establishes a three step
approach to interpretation. First, courts ought to discern the "subjective
purpose" of the insurance contract, namely, the joint subjective intent of
the parties. Second, in those cases where subjective intent cannot be
inferred by the court, it should resort to the objective purpose of the
contract by employing the reasonable expectations test. Third, and finally,
when courts cannot identify the objective purpose of the contract, they
ought to use the interpretationagainst the drafterrule.

T

his Essay seeks to elucidate and explore the important
connection between the interpretation of insurance contracts
and the Insurer's disclosure duty-a connection that has been
widely overlooked in the extant literature. At first glance, this
ambition may seem puzzling. After all, the insurer's duty to
disclose is important ex ante, before the insurance contract is
consummated, whereas interpretation rules come into play ex
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post, after a dispute arises between the parties. Upon further
reflection, however, it becomes apparent that the insurer's
disclosure duty and interpretive rules are inextricably related.
The way courts interpret insurance contracts ex post shapes the
incentives of the insurer to disclose information to potential
consumers ex ante. And vice versa, the scope and extent of the
initial disclosure invariably affect the interpretation of insurance
contracts ex post. Hence, the unique interpretation rules of
insurance law should be understood against the background of
the insurer's duty to disclose.
En route to establishing the connection between
interpretation and disclosure in insurance law, the Essay will
discuss the two principal interpretation tools used by the courts:
the "Interpretation against the Drafter" rule and "The Reasonable
Expectations" test. It will examine the evolution of these
doctrines, the policy rationales behind them and their application
by the courts. Special attention will be devoted to the internal
hierarchy between the two doctrines. The Essay then builds on
this discussion to propose two new models of interpretation that
are specifically designed to take account of the effect of the
insurer's disclosure on interpretation doctrines. Moreover, the
Essay demonstrates that the proposed models are superior to the
existing interpretive rule.
To get a handle on the importance of interpretive rules in
the insurance context, one must first understand the unique
nature of insurance contracts. Although insurance contracts share
certain characteristics with contracts that regulate other
consumer transactions,1 these common characteristics bear a
different weight when they appear in insurance transactions.
More importantly, the insurance contract has some characteristics
that do not exist in other contractual transactions, not even
consumer transactions. These latter, unique characteristics have
caused insurance contracts to develop into a separate field of law,
which, although affected by the perceptions underlying contract
laws in general and consumer laws in particular, nonetheless
developed as an independent branch of law with a theoretical
environment and legal regime all its own.
The special characteristics of insurance contracts may be
summarized in a nutshell: first, the subject matter of insurance
' For example, go% of all consumer contracts are standard contracts and
entail professional or economic gaps between the parties. See W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power,84 HARV. L. REv. 529,529(197I).
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contracts is an abstract and intangible one, the nature of which
insured consumers find difficult to understand due to various
informational and economic disadvantages. Second, the manner
of entering into an insurance contract differs from that of other
contracts. Third, the insurance contract itself is usually a
standard, or adhesion, contract and therefore the Insured's
freedom to negotiate and ability to influence its terms are limited.
Fourth, the contents of insurance contracts are lengthy and
strewn with concepts that are difficult for a non-professional to
understand. Finally, the transaction itself, which is often
perceived to be a transactional contract, is in fact a relational
contract.
These unique characteristics of insurance contracts have
had a direct influence on the formulation of the duties of
disclosure and rules of interpretation applicable in this field, as
well as on the symbiotic relationship that exists between the
disclosure and interpretation doctrines. The rules of
interpretation, just like duties of disclosure, function differently
in insurance contracts than in other contracts because they are
modified to respond to the complexities that characterize
insurance contracts.2 Insurance policies not only qualify as
contracts of adhesion, in the sense that the weaker party to the
transaction has no real ability to negotiate and is made subject to
terms dictated by the Insurer,' but are also difficult to understand
2

See

ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 129 (2d. ed.

1996); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
3i1 (i994); KENNETH H. YORK AND JOHN W. WHELAN, INSURANCE LAW,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS XV (1982); ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN I.

WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 614 (I988); Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of
Classification,4I STAN. L. REV. 661, 68o-68i (1989); James M. Fischer, Why
Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text
Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Dudi Schwartz, Insurance Laws Processes and Trends, THE ISRAELI LAW YEARBOOK- 1997, 31, 60-71.
3 On insurance contracts as typically satisfying the definition of a
standard contract, see EUGENE R. ANDERSON, INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION 45-48 (I997); JERRY, supra note 2, at 139; KEETON AND WIDISS,
supra note 2, at 119-120; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 87; SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 19-20 (4 th ed. 199o); Eugene R.
Anderson and James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance
Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5
CONN. INS. L. J. 335, 359 (1998); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240-245 (I995);
Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.
L. & ECON 461, 486 (I974); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983); W. David Slawson,
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due to the specialized, professional argot and arcane wordings
that appear in those same terms, so that even when laypeople do
read them, they do not fully understand them. Unlike other
consumer goods, whose purchasers can examine what they are
buying at the time of purchase, insurance goods are intangible
and too abstract for the insured consumer to understand fully the
nature of the sale.
The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by
2 1, 26 (1984).
4 On the difficulties of reading and understanding an insurance policy,
see
JERRY, supra note 2, at 139; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 319; KEETON AND
WIDISS, supra note 2, at 127; Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 6o U. CHI. L. REV. I, II
(1993); Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and
Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit
Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 850-856 (I977); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 240244; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1986);
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (,970); Uriel Procaccia, Readable Insurance
Policies:JudicialRegulation and Interpretation,14 ISR. L. REV. 74 (I979).
' See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative
Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 63 (1998); Fischer, supra note 2, at 1047; Mark C.
Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. I07, 125 (1998)
[hereinafter Rahdert, R.E. Revisited]; Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable
Expectations Reconsidered, I8 CONN. L. REV. 323, 326 (1986) [hereinafter
Rahdert, R.E. Reconsidered]; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 60-71. The
intangibility of insurance as a consumer good results from the fact that it is a
sale of risk. This widespread term, "intangibility," requires clarification. On
the basic cognitive level of a reasonable person who purchases insurance, the
risks that he perceives, and against which he purchases insurance, are the risks
that he can describe. In the simple sense of the word "tangible," they are very
tangible. Thus, for example, when a person purchases life insurance, he
foresees the event of his death, and when a person purchases property
insurance, he foresees the risk of property loss, and so forth. What can perhaps
be considered to be intangible in an insurance transaction is the time of the
occurrence of the insurance event and the manner in which it occurs. An
additional intangible matter (except in life insurance) is the level of certainty
that the event will occur. Obviously, the parts considered to be intangible, in
the simple sense of the word, in the eyes of the reasonable Insured are the
various exclusions to his insurance coverage. When the insurance event occurs
and the Insurer is finally required to pay the insurance benefits is when the
reasonable Insured first deals with those same matters of which he had not
been conscious before. This is, in fact, the first time the reasonable Insured
understands what the good that he purchased is and into exactly what
transaction he has entered. As such, insurance resembles a suit ordered from a
seamstress according to a general description of the client's desires and
measurements but which, until the client tries it on, is not necessarily
understood to be clothing that may or may not look like the client's

Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV.
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Compounding the abstractness of insurance goods is the
procedure by which they are sold. This procedure creates an
inevitable discrepancy between the insurance good as it is
perceived by the insured consumers at the time they enter into the
contract, and the good as it is delineated thereafter in the detailed
terms of the contract, or insurance policy.6 This discrepancy also
develops because, at the time that they enter into insurance
contracts, the Insureds do not have the detailed terms of the
policies at their disposal, and even if they did, it is very doubtful
that they could fully appreciate the terms because of their
professional and cognitive limitations. These same limitations are
therefore likely to create an additional market failure because the
consumers' inability to process and assimilate this information
deters them from demanding it from their Insurers.7
Furthermore, insurance contracts look like transaction
contracts, although they are in fact relational contracts. The
Insurers provide the insurance products at the time the insured
consumers sign the contract. When the Insured pay the
premiums, they are considered to have purchased the insurance
coverage. In contrast to regular consumer transactions, however,
the relationship between the parties does not end the minute that
they sign the policy. Rather, the insurance contract binds the
parties to perform specified acts and to cooperate long after they
enter into the contract and even after the occurrence of the
insured-against event, a situation more characteristic of a
relational contract.'
assumptions about it.
6 On the procedures

used when Insured consumers sign insurance

contracts and on the problems involved therein, see generally JERRY, supra
note 2, at 200; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 39; STEMPEL, supra note
2, at 319-20; William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking A
Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 270-71 (1986); Rahdert, R. E.
Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 329; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 4o; Stephen J.
Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1461, 1463 (1989).
' For descriptions of other market failures, such as those that relate to the
health insurance industry, see Abraham, supra note 5. On cognitive restrictions
and their effect on the insurance consumer, see the discussion on the Insurer's
duty of disclosure and its theoretical basis, see Abraham, supra note 5, at Ch.i
notes 135-26o and accompanying text.
8 See Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV
691 (1974); see also Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism:The
Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 709-12 (1990);
D. Campbell, Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract, 20
OXFORD J.L. STUD. 477 (2000); Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott,
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These traits of insurance contracts have led to the
development of unique interpretive doctrines. In contract law,
courts generally resolve disputes by examining the parties'
mutual intent.9 By contrast, in disputes involving insurance
contracts, courts ignore the actual intent of the parties, and
resolve disputes through interpretation of the contracts. This
approach rests on the notion that invalidating an insurance
contract for lack of mutual intent will likely lead to repudiation of
the insurance coverage itself, whereas treating the case as one of
contract interpretation will allow courts to preserve the insured
consumer's insurance coverage. We can therefore view the
insurance contract rules of interpretation that the courts have
formulated as a means to recast abstract insurance goods into a
form more closely resembling those of more concrete consumer
goods. This approach bridges the inherent information gaps
between the Insurer and the Insured, not in advance when the
contract is entered into, but at least in retrospect, when the
dispute is decided. As I will show, the courts' use of interpretive
rules is thus not intended to resolve what are typically classified
as problems of interpretation, as is customary in commercial. or
consumer contracts. ° Rather, because of the special public
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. lO89 (1981); Ian R. MacNeil,

Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483,
483 (1985); Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contract as a Relationship
Management Form, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 127, (1995); Schwartz, supra note 2,
at 42.
9 Fischer, supra note 2, at 997; Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5,

at 337; Ware, supranote 6, at 1467.
'oThe problem of insurance contract interpretation arises when the
language of the contract is vague, the contract's structure is defective, or the
contract contains non-contractual information that is otherwise incompatible
with its contents, such as references to various publications. There are various
sources for these interpretation problems including those of which the Insurer
is aware but does nothing to address, as well as those of which the Insurer is
completely unaware. For example, Insurers may draft contracts without
considering future developments not within the cognizance of either party at
the time. Nonetheless, Insurers may also choose to use vague wording because
they want to avoid deterring potential Insureds from agreeing to the policy or
because some situations are difficult to predict and anticipate. Sometimes the
Insurer simply chooses to leave the wording as is because the costs of changing
it would probably exceed the total potential damages from any resulting
claims. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 427-28 (3d ed. 1999);
JERRY, supra note 2, at 126-128; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and

Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 590
(1982).
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interest in preserving insurance coverage, these rules have often
served to implement broader public policy considerations."'
After explaining the goal and operation of the
interpretation against the drafter rule and the reasonable
expectations test, I examine the relationship between these
interpretive tools and the Insurer's duty to disclose. I show that
while courts do consider the scope and level of information
disclosure by Insurers in interpreting insurance contracts, they do
not give this factor sufficient weight. Hence, I conclude with a
normative proposal of how better to incorporate disclosure
considerations into the two leading interpretive approaches to
insurance contracts.
The remainder of the Essay unfolds in three parts. In Part
I, I present and discuss the two main interpretive approaches to
insurance contracts-the "Interpretation Against the Drafter"
rule and the "Reasonable Expectations" test. I discuss the
evolution of each doctrine and how courts apply them in practice.
In Part II, I explore the symbiotic relationship between
interpretation rules and disclosure duties in insurance law.
Finally, in Part III, I propose a new approach to interpretation of
insurance contracts that takes into accoun t the scope and extent
of insurance companies' disclosure duties. A short conclusion
ensues.
I.

RULES OF INTERPRETATION FOR INSURANCE CONTRACTS

A. An Overview
The two central rules of interpretation that have evolved
with regard to insurance contracts are the rule of Interpretation
against the Drafter" (usually the Insurer) and the Reasonable
" It was in this context that the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
doctrine was specially developed. See discussion, supra notes 45-97, and
accompanying text.
12 For a description of how this rule relates to insurance contracts in
England, see JOHN BIRDS, MODERN INSURANCE LAW 234 (4 th ed. i997);
MALCOLM A. CLARKE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 352-57 (994);
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 3, 262

(i96o);

E.R.HARDY IVAMY,

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 388-94 (6th ed. 1993); in the
United States, see FARNSWORTH, supra note io, at 471; JERRY, supra note 2, at
144; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 628; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 173;

Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation,95 MICH.
L. REV. 531 (1996); Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 328; see also
RESTATEMENT (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (i98i) ("In choosing among the
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Expectations of the Insured test. 3 Customarily, principles of
interpretation that apply to contract law generally are said to
apply to insurance law as well, 4 and indeed, the above two
interpretation doctrines can be viewed as lying at the heart of the
well-known dispute between the two schools of thought on
general contract interpretation. The first school is identified with
Samuel Williston 15 and preaches reliance on the language within
the four corners of the contract. This school thus relies on
assigning responsibility to the drafter in event of any textual
ambiguity under the rule of Interpretation against the Drafter.
The other school is associated with Arthur Corbin16 and preaches
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that
meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies
the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
13 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 66-76; JERRY,
supra note 2, at I41; KEETON
AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 627; BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THOMAS R.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 17-38 (9 th ed.
1998); STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 3ii; Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law
and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the
Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. II5I (I98I); Abraham, supra note i2; Laurie Kindel
Fett, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and
Stretching TraditionalTools of Contract Interpretation,i8 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1113 (1992); Fischer, supra note 2, at 1o02; Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 5,
OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (I99O); Robert E. Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the
Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976); Robert H. Jerry, Insurance, Contract
and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998);
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 70. On the distinction between a principle and a
doctrine in the context of the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test, see
Abraham, supra note 5, at 59, 6i; Robert E. Keeton, supra note 13, at 275, 27677.
14 JERRY, supra note 2, at 129; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 627;
STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 3II; Fischer, supra note 4, at
i01; Jerry, supra note
13, at 21; David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988); Peter
Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal
for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1038 (I99I).
" See WILLISTON, supra note 3. This is the "Four Corners" approach.
16 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 3, 262 (196o); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note io, at 417. For a description of the dispute between
Williston and Corbin's approaches and its developments over the years in the
United States,. see Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U.L. REV.
49 (1995); for a history of American interpretation of legal text, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); William S.
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1982); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian
JudicialArtist: Statutes and New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983).
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interpretation informed, from the outset of the interpretive
process, by the external circumstances and evidence surrounding
the agreement. Because the Insured's reasonable expectations are
perceived to be a part of these external circumstances, they have7
the power to prevail over the express text of the agreement.
Despite this and the fact that rules on insurance contract
interpretation can be seen as a part- of contract law more
generally, we shall nonetheless see that insurance law's rules,
including interpretive rules, were designed to distinguish the
insurance industry from other fields of contract law.'
The one common denominator of insurance law
interpretation rules is that they are all designed to accord
protection to the Insured's interests. For example, the rule of
"Interpretation against the Drafter" was once and still remains
the most popular rule of interpretation for insurance contracts.
According to this rule, the scales always tip in favor of the
Insured, and against the Insurer who drafted the contract,
whenever the disputed contract text is receptive to two or more
reasonable interpretations.1 9 To this rule the courts have also
added local rules of interpretation, which share this common goal
of protecting the interests of the Insured. These local rules include
those requiring, insofar as possible, insurance contract
17RESTATEMENT (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981)

follows the Corbin

school of interpretation. This section allows the attribution of greater weight to
the circumstances leading to contract formation and the abandonment of
textual interpretation framework. The section states that each detail in a
contract that one of the parties has reason to believe is a detail customarily
found in that kind of contract, must be honored unless that same party has
reason to believe that the other party would have refrained from signing the
agreement had it known the detail's inclusion therein. Comment f to this
section states that, although signatories to standard contracts are, for the most
part, bound to all the details in the contract, including those that they either
did not read or understand, they are not bound to details that both are unread
and deviate from their reasonable expectations. The tension between the two
schools of interpretation is also reflected in the debate between Justice Scalia,
who favors textual interpretation of statutes, and Justice Stevens, who prefers
interpretation of statutes based on their legislative intent. See, e.g., AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
51, U.S. 244 (1994); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992);
Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992); see also the debate between
Judges Easterbrook and Posner, United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312
(1990).
IS
19

See sources cited supra note 4.
See sources cited supra note 12; see also Fischer, supra note 2, at 996,

,005-07.
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interpretations that maintain the Insured's coverage; that
comport with the understanding of a reasonable Insured party,
not a reasonable Insurer; and that give broad construction to
terms and conditions that expand coverage but narrow
20
construction to those that restrict it.
These rules of interpretation are therefore anchored either
directly or indirectly in the actual text of the insurance contract
itself, as are other doctrines used in contract interpretation.
Among this latter group, the doctrines of estoppel, forbearance,
and unconscionability figure prominently. 21 Just as the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule effectively gives courts the
discretion to find ambiguity in a policy, even where none can
truly be said to exist, so as to the employ the rule for the benefit of
the Insured,2 2 so, too, do courts use the unconscionability doctrine
to grant themselves the relative power to intervene in the
contractual text.23 As already stated, however, these doctrines
depend on the text of the insurance contract and on the conduct
of the parties to it. The courts are therefore limited in their ability
to use these rules beyond what is required by the particular issues
at hand in any given dispute.
Against this background of limited applicability of
interpretation doctrines, and the artificial ways in which courts
often must use them to protect the interests of the Insured even
20

See cases cited infra passim; JERRY, supra note

2,

at 136; Fischer, supra

note 2, at 1004-05.

It is doubtful whether estoppel and forbearance can be viewed as rules
of interpretation, but they can be classified as complementary doctrines, which
come after interpretation of the contract has been complete. JERRY, supra note
2, at 149-5o; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 614-17; STEMPEL, supra
note 2, at 155, 209-24; Abraham, supra note 12, at 514; Abraham, supra note 5,
21

at 61; Mayhew, supra note 6, at 267, 268; Ware, supra note 6, at 1465.
22 BENJAMIN M. ANDERSON, ON LIFE INSURANCE 182-183
(1991) (calling
this ambiguity "Constructive Ambiguity"); Fischer, supra note 2, at iooo;
Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 328; Rahdert, R. E. Revisited,
supra note 5, at 118; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 66; Ware, supra note 6, at 1465.
23 On the unconscionability doctrine in general contract law and
its
application in insurance contracts, see SINAI DEUTSCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS:
THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY (1977); ROBERT COOTER AND
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 280 (3d ed. 2ooo); FARNSWORTH, supra
note io, at 495; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 623; STEMPEL, supra
note 2, at 242; M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J.
757 (1969); Jerry, supra note 14, at 36; Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 1,5 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Rahdert,
R. E. Revisited, supra note 5, at 126; see also RESTATEMENT (2D) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 208, 211 (1981).
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absent any sound textual or contextual foundation,24 the principle
of the "Reasonable Expectations of the Insured" evolved. 25 Its

main innovation lies in its ability to overcome the explicit terms
of the insurance agreement in those cases in which the terms are
inconsistent with the Insured's reasonable expectations. 6 As
distinguished from the more textually bound interpretive rules
described above, the Reasonable Expectations principle has the
potential to affect judicial policies independently of the text of the
contract and the conduct of the parties. These judicial policies
can thereby extend beyond determination of the immediate
dispute and toward a more general consideration of the Insured
public's interests and, in exceptional cases, of the insurance
market as a whole.2 ' Accordingly, in this Part, I will show that
any discussion of the parties' duties of disclosure, especially the
Insurer's duty to disclose, cannot be complete without examining
the symbiotic relationship that exists between the duties of
disclosure and the rules of interpretation. The course of the
following discussion will therefore turn first to the rule of
"Interpretation against the Drafter" and second to the principle of
"Reasonable Expectations." The discussion will then describe in
further detail the symbiotic relationship existing between the
rules of disclosure and the rules of interpretation and develop an
outline for an applied model of insurance contract interpretation.
B. Interpretationagainst the Drafter

In the proceeding subsections, I discuss the moral,
economic and distributional rationales behind the interpretation
against the drafter rule. My goal in this discussion is to show how
24 See sources cited supra note 22.
25

On the argument that the interpretation doctrines were insufficient in

order to resolve disputes in the insurance field, see KEETON AND WIDISS, supra
note 2, at 628; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 320; Abraham, supra note 13, at
1,74-82; Fischer, supra note 2, at lOO2; Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra
note 5, at 336-345; Ware, supra note 6, at 1465.
26 Keeton, supra note 4. The classic version of the Reasonable Expectations
test was formulated in this article and is called the "whole transaction" version.
Keeton explains, "[t]he objective and intended expectations of the beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations." Id.; see also KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 613-652.
27See JERRY, supra note 2, at 143; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at
646; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 321; Abraham, supra note 5,at 6o; Fischer,
supra note 2, at 1004.
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the rule is tailored to the unique characteristics of insurance
transactions. I then examine how the rule has been applied in
practice by the courts.
i. The Rationales For Applying The Rule
Much ink has been spilled over the rule of Interpretation
against the Drafter.2 The significance of the rule, in essence, is
that when more than one reasonable interpretation of a contract
term exists, the court will adopt the interpretation disfavoring the
party who drafted the term. The rationale behind the rule
incorporates the concept of fault, as well as other economic,
distributional and consumer protection considerations.2 9 The
primary application of the rule is in the insurance field, stemming
from the fact that the Insurer drafts the contract and therefore, as
the party at fault, appropriately bears the responsibility for any
vague language.) ° However, economic, distributional and
consumer considerations that are unique to the insurance field
also play a role. From an economic efficiency perspective, an
agreement would be efficient only when its terms are clear and
unambiguous because only unambiguous terms can lead to
realization of the agreement without imposing undue costs on the
parties or wasting judicial time in interpreting the contract.
Under this view, the courts should confine themselves to
resolving these ambiguities and thereby preserving the economic
efficiency of the underlying contract.3 1
The party best able to minimize textual ambiguity is the
party that controls the language of the agreement, and thus, it is
this party that should be held liable for failure to do so. Also,
from a professional and economic standpoint, the Insurer should
bear the liability as the generally more powerful party, and
therefore more capable of influencing the ambiguity of a
contract's terms. The justification for interpreting vague terms
against Insurers also relies on insurance's putative function as an
important means for dissipating the cost of harm. In fact, the
entire purpose of insurance is to dissipate costs by shifting risk
28 See
29 See

sources cited supra note 12.
id. For criticism, see Miller, supra note 14, at 1849; Michael B.
Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and InsuranceLaw: Why InsuranceContracts
Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter,30 GA. L. REV. 171 (I995).
0 See sources cited supra note 12.
3 Fischer, supra note 2, at 1004, io6o; Rahdert, R. E. Revisited, supra note
5, at II;

Ware, supra note 6, at 1465.
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the "deep pocket" is therefore justified
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(the insurance pool). An
and treats the Insurer as
because it shifts liability
insurance's purpose of

dissipating cost.3 2 Thus, under this approach contract ambiguity

is considered to be a transaction cost the Insurer assumes and
then redistributes through premiums onto the Insured public as a
whole so as not to burden the wallet of a single Insured consumer.
Furthermore, as already stated, insurance is not a market
good but rather is an abstract and intangible product embodied
in an insurance agreement.33 Vague language is therefore likely to
be perceived as a defect in the product for which the Insurer must
be held accountable, just as other manufacturers are held
accountable for their products.34 In other words, the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule rests on rationales that
apply to all agreements unilaterally drafted by a single party, but
in the insurance industry these same rationales apply with even
greater force, further adding to the unique nature of insurance
contracts.
2.

Application Of The Rule

A perusal of how courts use the Interpretation against the
Drafter rule reveals that they deal with it in a rather simplistic
manner. No attempt has been made to establish a complex model
for applying the rule, beyond the maxim that the rule shall be
applied wherever ambiguities appear in an insurance agreement.
It is also difficult to infer from the case law any meaningful
guidelines for determining when insurance language is vague and
the rule therefore applicable. 3 As I will show in this Part, courts
in practice apply the rule not only in those cases where the text is
indeed open to several reasonable interpretations, but also in
cases where the most reasonable interpretation favors the Insurer.
In fact, courts also apply it in even more extreme cases where the
text is actually clear but the court simply conjures "ambiguity out
of thin air" in order to employ the rule. By using it in this manner,
the courts have in fact turned the rule of Interpretation Against
the Drafter into one that broadens judicial policy, albeit in the
32

STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 321;

Abraham, supra note
3I See

12,

Abraham, supra note 13, at 1185-87;

at 534, 538-39; Fischer, supra note

sources cited supra note 5.
3' Rahdert, R. E. Revisited, supra note 5, at 123.
35 See sources cited supra note 22.

2,

at 1004, io6o.
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guise of a textual interpretation rule.36 I will therefore examine
various possible standards for applying the rule and then analyze
the ways in which the courts have applied the rule under those
same standards.
The first step in applying the rule is to find that the text of
an insurance policy is vague. When courts decide that text is
vague, however, and therefore assign responsibility to the
Insurer, they do not consider whether the Insurer could possibly
have drafted the text in a clearer manner and eliminated the
ambiguity. Although it can be argued that whereas an Insurer
who negligently drafts vague policy terms should bear the
resulting costs, an Insurer who takes due care in drafting terms
that are in fact impossible to phrase in a less ambiguous manner
should not be subject to the rule.
The next question that then arises is whether the
ambiguity of text should be determined from the perspective of
what the Insurer knew and understood at the time it drafted the
contract, or from the perspective of what the Insurer knew and
understood only after the insured-againstevent occurs, that is, in
hindsight.
The courts do not address these distinctions,
however, and instead seem not to take into account at all either
the drafter's level of care or its ability to improve on the clarity of
its contracts. Thus, in those cases where ambiguous contract
terms are susceptible to several possible interpretations, the
courts effectively impose absolute liability on the Insurer. In this
way the courts further deemphasize the textual dimension of the
contract: among the various rationales that courts could use to
justify applying the Interpretation Against the Drafter rule, the
rationales to which they actually resort do not depend on the
Insurer's level of care in drafting of the contract terms, but are
instead rationales based essentially on judicial policies such as
distributive justice and consumer protection. From an economic
perspective, this approach imposes fewer administrative costs
36

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 69; see also sources cited supra note 22.

3 Had the court examined it, it would have been appropriate to decide at
what point in time the ambiguity should have been examined. Examination at
the stage of contract formation is usually to the benefit of the Insurer because
only the information known at that time would be relevant, not information
learned in retrospect. In this sense, the time of contract formation is the same
pivotal point to which the contract law reverts to analyze other contractual
issues such as the scope of the injured party's just compensation.
38 On the cognitive bias in the matter of hindsight wisdom - "The
Hindsight Bias," - see the discussion on the Insurer's duties of disclosure,
supra Ch. i notes 188-9I and accompanying text.
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than one that examines whether the drafter could have improved
the clarity of the contract's text. This strict liability approach
thus absolves the courts from deciding the issue of Insurer fault, a
process that involves looking at what alternative wordings would
have been possible at the time the parties entered into the
contract and what the nature of the market was at that time.39
Because they dogmatically impose absolute liability on
Insurers, courts also do not examine whether the Insured
consumers were indeed interested,, at the time of contract
formation, in receiving the level and type of coverage that the
courts ultimately award them. Nor do they examine whether the
Insured consumers were indeed willing to pay for this coverage.
Were courts to take these latter issues into consideration, they
would presumably apply the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule only in those cases in which the Insured consumers would
have been willing ex ante, at the time that they bought the
insurance, to pay for the level of coverage that they ultimately
receive under this rule. In all other cases, the Insurer should be
exempt from liability for the additional coverage. According to
this test, in other words, not every ambiguity in the text of an
insurance contract should lead to interpretation in favor of the
Insured.4" If, in applying the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule, the courts would take into consideration the ability of the
Insurer to improve the clarity of the text, on the one hand, and
the willingness of the Insured to pay for broader insurance
" Abraham, supra note 12, at 546. The test of whether the text is vague is
ostensibly based on the logic of the "reasonable reader," but it is clear that this
test relies heavily on judicial intuition and therefore is likely to lead the courts
to accept and examine circumstantial evidence, an examination which in itself
is problematic when the contract is a standard contract.
40 Kenneth S. Abraham suggests this method of interpretation in his
article. Abraham, supra note 12. A similar method of analysis is also used
when deciding whether to compensate a party breach of contract with injuries
that are not financial. Here, too, if the injured party is asked after the contract
is breached whether he would be willing to receive compensation for mental
damages due to the breach, he would certainly answer in the affirmative. If,
however, the injured party ex ante, at the time that the contract was entered
into, would be willing to pay a higher price for the contract so that the other
party can insure himself against the risk of having to pay the first party for
mental damage, he would obviously answer in the negative. This shows that
contracting parties are usually more interested in compensation for their
financial damages from the breach of contract, and they are not necessarily
interested in a more expensive transaction simply for the chance to obtain
damages unrelated to profits. See Samuel A. Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and
Breach of Contract, ii J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1982).
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coverage on the other hand, then it could be said that the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule indeed functions in the
contractual domain and takes into account the apparent intent of
the parties to the contract.
The scope of the courts' discretion could also be expanded,
however, into a more complex and less one-dimensional approach
that would fluctuate between a moderate defense of the Insured
with real consideration of the Insurer's interests and the
traditional consumer model, which takes into account only the
Insured's interests. By taking into account the Insurer's level of
care in drafting the policy and Insured's willingness to pay for the
insurance coverage ultimately provided, the courts can protect
the Insured's interests and, of course, benefit the Insurer. An
approach that would place even more weight on the interests of
the Insured, however, could be created by imposing liability on
the Insurer whenever ambiguity exists, regardless of the Insurer's
level of care, but subject to the willingness of the Insured to pay
for the additional insurance coverage. Under such an approach,
the Insurer's liability is not absolute but is nonetheless rather
strict. The standard that places the most weight on the interests
of the Insured is one that imposes absolute strict liability on the
Insurer, regardless not only of the Insurer's level of care in
drafting the contract but also of the Insured's willingness to pay
for the additional coverage. 4
As already stated, the courts in actual practice do not in
fact look at either of these considerations. Instead, they act under
the guise of contract law in order to dictate judicial policy of a
non-contractual, public nature. Contract-related concerns, such
as the Insurer's fault and the Insured's intent, are discarded at
the courts' discretion in applying the "Interpretation against the
Drafter" rule." It should be noted, though, that courts could
Abraham, supra note 12.
42 The Interpretation against the Drafter rule is sometimes presented as a
rule of last resort in interpretation and as coming into effect only after the
other interpretation methods have been exhausted. Thus, only after judges
have exhausted methods for trying to determine the subjective and objective
purposes of the parties and have arrived at a number of interpretations of
possible objective purposes that are reasonable to the same degree, will they
turn to the Interpretation Against the Drafter rule. This rule is perceived to be
a secondary rule that exempts judges from limits on their discretion. An
analysis of the case law indicates that in practice, the courts apply the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule much more powerfully than the case
law rhetoric would suggest. In fact, the rule is predictably applied in favor of
the Insured, in that courts already assume from the start that the subjective
"
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easily modify this rule to take account of the Insurer's level of
care and the Insured's ex ante willingness to purchase additional
coverage.
C. The Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
In the following subsections, I examine how the "the
Reasonable Expectation test" has emerged alongside the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule. I pay particular heed to
the similarities and differences between the two rules. I then
discuss how the reasonable expectation test evolved over time in
the courts' decisions.
i. Historical Background
Along with the "Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule, a
second interpretive standard was developed to resolve insurance
disputes: the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test.4 3
Robert Keeton introduced the test in an article published in
1970.44 In this article Keeton analyzed.the case law on insurance
disputes and showed that in practice, courts resolve insurance
disputes through interpretive means and in doing so, assign
decisive weight to the Insured's reasonable expectations. He
further noted that under this doctrine, courts favor the Insured
even when the language of the policy explicitly indicates
otherwise, adhering instead to the Insured's reasonable
expectations. 45 According to Keeton's article, the novelty of this

purpose of an insurance contract will be difficult to determine and that the
objective purpose of the contract will not be mutual, and therefore the rule
that supposedly is one of last resort in fact becomes a rule of first resort.
Perusal of all case law indicates that those courts that apply the rule do so in a
simplistically decisive manner, without employing a more complex application
model that would take into account the weave of considerations detailed
above. Thus, it becomes apparent that in practice, the Interpretation Against
the Drafter rule becomes a vehicle for judicial policy that merely acts under
the guise of a contract interpretation rule to seem less invasive than its true
practical application. As was discussed above, the application of the rule in
fact takes into consideration only the Insured consumer's interests and
distributive public interests, without taking into account other considerations
such as the Insurer's blamelessness in drafting the wording and the Insured's
willingness to pay in advance for the doubtful insurance coverage.
41 See sources cited supra note 13.
44 Id.

41See

sources cited supra note 26.
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doctrine is that, where application of the "Interpretation Against
the Drafter" rule requires an element of textual ambiguity, the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test can be applied even
when the wording of the text is unequivocally clear.46
This article later proved to be very influential in the way
courts and scholars resolved insurance disputes: although the
courts were already taking the Insured's reasonable expectations
into consideration even before Keeton's article appeared,47
Keeton positively identified the phenomenon and formulated it
into an express test. Indeed, ever since he coined the phrase
"reasonable expectations" test, the reasonable expectations of the
Insured have become a point of reference for both those who
support and oppose their use. 48 A review of the case law and of
scholarly articles suggests that no other doctrine has led to such
an ambivalent reaction in 49the insurance field as has the
Reasonable Expectations test.

The power of the test lies in the fact that courts now have
an unconventional tool that, in contrast to the "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" rule, enables them to disregard the text of an
insurance agreement and instead reach a decision according to
judicial policies that they themselves design and dictate. Whereas
the Interpretation Against the Drafter rule, even in its broadest
construction, such as when various interpretations of the text are
46

Id.

On the Insured's reasonable expectations as an important element in
contract disputes long before the publication of Keeton's article, see SPENCER
41

L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A

STUDY IN THE LEGAL

IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON
WISCONSIN RECORDS, 1835-1959, 210 (I960); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV.

629, 633-36 (I943); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions upon
Economics, i5 AM. ECON. REV. 665 (1925); Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews,
52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (I939).
48 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING

RISK: INSURANCE,

LEGAL

STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 31I;
at 275; Mayhew, supra note 6, at 267-77; Rahdert, R. E.

THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 103

Keeton, supra note 13,
Reconsidered, supra note 5, at

(I986);

323-25;

Jeffrey

W. Stempel,

Unmet

Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach
and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. I8I, 188
(1998); Ware, supra note 6, at 1466.
41 See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 2, at 141; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at
313;
Abraham, supra note 13, at ii53; Abraham, supra note 5, at 60-63; James M.
Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is Indispensable, If We
Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. I5I, i6o-6i (1998); Henderson, supra
note 13, at 823.
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possible but not necessarily equally reasonable, ultimately
depends on the text of an insurance policy, the Reasonable
Expectations test relegates that same text to merely one of the
factors that warrant consideration, not the decisive factor. In fact,
in certain cases the courts might even ignored the text. ° Even
under the strong form of the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule, where the courts focus on the text to find ambiguities that a
lay reader would be hard-pressed to detect, the Insurer can at
least cope with the rule by improving the language of the
insurance agreement and replacing the (often dubious) ambiguity
with accurate and unequivocal wording. The Reasonable
Expectations test, on the other hand, releases the courts from
these obvious manipulations of the text, which sometimes
traverse the borders of reasonableness. The test thus enables the
courts to rule in contradiction to the text and in agreement with
whatever policy considerations they deem appropriate for the
case at hand.
Indeed, it is easy to understand why the debate that arose
around the Reasonable Expectations test probed the very roots of
contract law and rekindled the dispute between the Williston and
Corbin schools of thought." The test reflects the tension between
the one approach, which views contract text as the main and
sometimes exclusive indicator of the parties' intent, and the other
more expansive approach, which treats a contract's text as only
'0

Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.,

17o

A.2d

22

(N.J. I96I) well

exemplifies the aforesaid and is perceived to be one of the first judgments in
which use was made of the Reasonable Expectations test. In this case, the
court determined that the Insured was entitled to coverage due to a disability
from Parkinson's disease. The policy contained an explicit exclusion according
to Which the Insured was not entitled to coverage in the event of disability as a
result of a disease. The court determined that: "When members of the public
purchase policies of Insurance they are entitled to the broad measure of
protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations." Id. at 24. Another
earlier case which is seen as the birth of the Reasonable Expectations test is
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 16o F.2d 599 (2d. Cir. 1947). In this
case, the policy explicitly prescribed that insurance would not come into force
until the Insurer had explicitly accepted the Insured's application. The
applicant completed the application but died in the interim period, and the
court determined that the insurance would cover the event, despite the explicit
language, because any other result would be incompatible with the reasonable
expectations of the Insured applicant. After these cases, many courts began, to
apply the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test to command insurance
coverage even when contrary to the clear and explicit language of the
insurance contract.
51 See supra notes 15, i6 and accompanying text.
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one part of a much larger picture that includes other parameters
such as surrounding circumstances, policy considerations, and
function. Insofar as they relate to the Reasonable Expectations
test, these debates provoke discussions in much wider circles as
well, sometimes to the point of positing a connection between the
development of this test and the political and cultural dimensions
of the United States as a nation.
The actual development of the Reasonable Expectations
of the Insured test in the United States occurred over a span of
four decades. In the I96os up to the publication of Keeton's
article in 197o, before the test was given an explicit name, it was
applied by way of a rather broad legal principle, namely, a
recurring and often unconscious tendency to view the Insured's
reasonable expectations53 as relevant in an insurance dispute. As
Keeton argued, the only way to understand the underlying logic
of decisions rendered during the I96Os is to view the courts as
tending to honor the Insured's reasonable expectations.5 4 After
Keeton published his article in 197o, however, a significant
number of states expressly adopted the test, and it evolved from
the general and abstract principle used in the I96os to a specific
and concrete doctrine and judicial tool in resolving insurance
disputes.5 ' Acceptance of the doctrine in various states sometimes
may have resulted from the relatively bad reputation of Insurers.
52

STEMPEL,

supra note

2, at 267;

see also BOB

WOODWARD AND SCOTT

ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT INTRODUCTION

(979).

" Abraham, supra note 5, at 6o; Keeton, supra note 13, at 2 76-77; Stempel,
supra note 48, at 184-86.
54 Keeton, supra note 4, at 967.
55 See sources cited supra note 53; on the use of the doctrine as
a tool to
resolve disputes in the 1970's, see C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). In this case, the Insured obtained insurance
coverage despite the policy's explicit statement that signs of a burglary were
necessary in order to receive insurance coverage. The court held that it was the
reasonable expectation of the Insured to receive coverage in the event of a
burglary, even in the absence of signs of force. In Corgatelli v. Globe Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1975), a rodeo rider broke part of his
collarbone while riding. Under his personal injury insurance policy, insurance
coverage would be granted only in case of a complete fracture. The court used
the doctrine in granting coverage contrary to the language of the policy. In
Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), the court used the
doctrine to find that the Plaintiff was entitled to insurance coverage, even
though the insurance contract explicitly determined that the Plaintiff was not
entitled to insurance coverage until the express confirmation by the Insurer of
the acceptance of its application.
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It was this ill-repute that had led the courts to create judicial
policies favoring the Insured consumers in the first place, as an
act pursuant to a national interest in protecting the interests of
the Insured and even in indirectly encouraging faith in the
insurance system as a whole. 56 The early adoption of the broad
principle and its later transformation into a specific doctrine also
released the courts from whatever philosophical distress they
must have experienced in trying to decide in favor of the Insured
where the text of an insurance policy unequivocally favored the
Insurer. In this way the Reasonable Expectations test freed the
courts from unreasonably stretching the boundaries of the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule beyond the actual text.
Keeton's article had landed on fertile soil, and the enthusiastic
58
adoption of the doctrine and its application marked the i97os.
However, enthusiasm for the Reasonable Expectations
test waned somewhat after the 197os. A certain regression can be

detected in the doctrine's use in the United States during the
i98os,59 due to fear that massive overuse could potentially
undermine the stability and certainty of contractual relations
between Insurers and Insureds.60 In the last decade various states
See discussion on comparative research of mutual disclosure in an
insurance transaction, supra Ch. 2 notes 10- 12 and accompanying text; see also
Reuben Hasson, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract:A Comparison
of the American and English Law of Insurance, 47 MOD. L. REV. 505, 521-522
(1984). On concerns about increasing the faith of the public in the insurance
system, see, e.g., Anderson and Fournier, supra note 3, at 385; Fischer, supra
note 2, at 12o5; Fischer, supra note 49, at 17O; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39.
57 For a review of the doctrine in the various states in the United States,
since Keeton's article and throughout the years, see OSTRAGER AND NEWMAN,
56

supra note 13, at

22;

STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 342; YORK AND WHELAN,

supra note 2, at 54-63; Henderson, supra note I3; Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered,
supra note 5, at 324; Susan M. Popik and Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable
Expectations After Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425
(1998).

51 Id; see also Abraham, supra note I3; Arnold P. Anderson, Life Insurance
ConditionalReceipts and Judicial Intervention, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 593 (I98O);
Sheldon T. Fleck, Reasonable Expectations: The Insurer's Dilemma, 24
DRAKE L. REV. 853 (I975); Frank E. Gardner, Reasonable Expectations:
Evolution Completed or Revolution Begun? 69 INS. L.J. 573 (I978).
"' See sources cited supra note 56. For an example of the retreat of the
doctrine as it is reflected in the case law, see also STEMPEL, supra note 2, at
342; William Mark Lashner, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982); Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5;
Stempel, supra note 48, at 196, 265.
60 For a discussion of positions both supporting and qualifying the
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have remained aware of the Reasonable Expectations test, but
only some of them actually use it,6' and even those states that do
use the test, do so cautiously and only after they have exhausted
less controversial legal tools such as the Interpretation Against
the Drafter rule and supplementary doctrines such as estoppel
and forbearance.
To a great extent, the Reasonable
Expectations test of the past decade has again become a general
tendency or abstract legal principle that courts merely take into
account, rather than a defined doctrine for daily use.63 In this
way, the evolution of the test can be seen as the closing of a circle.
From its inception in the I96os, it was often an unrecognized but
active consideration just beneath the surface; in the 1970s the
abstract principle became a specific doctrine used on a relatively
massive scale; and in the 198os a sobering up occurred, leading to
repression of the doctrine for fear that extensive application
would subvert the fundamental allocation of risks between
Insurers and Insureds, cause Insurers to increase premiums, and
even in certain cases, to hurt or cripple Insurers' financial
stability. 64 Finally, the i9gos combined the 1970s' thesis of
Reasonable Expectations test, see infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
6' ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 66-76; JERRY, supra note 2, at 141-47;
OSTRAGER AND NEWMAN, supra note I3, at I7-38; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at
311-358; Henderson, supra note 13, at 823; Jerry, supra note 13, at 22-23; Popik

and Quackenbos, supra note 57; Stempel, supra note 48, at
62 Id.
63 Abraham, supra note 5, at 6o; Abraham, supra note
supra note 48, at 184.
64 For a discussion

210.
12,

at 541; Stempel,

on the various criticisms of the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured test, see infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
Fora review of the regression in the use of the doctrine, see sources cited supra
note 55, some of which, for example, review the use of the Reasonable
Expectations test in Iowa. In 1975, the courts began to use the test massively in
C & J Fertilizer,Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 169. For several years, it appeared as
though the Iowa courts were consistently using the test. See, e.g., Edwards v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 296 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 198o); Johnson v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 272 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1978); Gibson v. Milwaukee
Mut. Ins. Co., 265 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1978). In time, this trend began to
change, however, and in several later cases, the courts ruled it impossible to
ground a reasonable expectations analysis in either the wording of the contract
or in the actions of the Insurer. The courts also held that the test could not be
used so long as there was reasonable language in the insurance contract, and in
fact, they refused to apply it unless they found a textual ambiguity or term or
condition that contradicted the intentions of the parties. See, e.g., Chipokas v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 267 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1978); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); M-Z Enterprises v. HawkeyeSec. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 4o8 (Iowa 1982); Bankers LifeCo. v. Aetna Cas. &
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emphasis on reasonable expectations with the i98os' antithesis
into a synthesis converting the Reasonable Expectations test from
a specific and express doctrine back into a more abstract superprinciple that serves to affect judicial policy and guide the
conduct of Insurers and their Insureds.6
2.

Application Of The Test

A perusal of various United States court rulings reveals
that courts employ the Reasonable Expectations test on a wide
scale. Use of the test ranges from no use at all in certain states to
use in its classic sense as Keeton defined it: namely, honoring the
Insured's reasonable expectations even when it contradicts the
explicit language of the insurance policy. Most states apply the
test in variations between these two extremes, with the only
common denominator being the use of the phrase "Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured." In other words, states refer to the
test by the same name, even though their particular version
differs from both Keeton's original conception and versions used
in other states. 6
Sur. Co., 366 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa 1985). A similar process occurred in New
Jersey. Kievit, 17o A.2d at 22 marked the beginning of the Reasonable
Expectations test in New Jersey and even served as one of the sources for
Keeton's article. During the I96os and I970s, the use of the test was wellestablished in the State. See Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 362.
At the end of the 1970s, the status of the test was undermined, and it was held
that the test would be used only when the insurance contract conditions were
vague. In contrast, when the language of the contract was clear, no use could
be made of the test. See Diorio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 398 A.2d 1274
(N.J. 1979); Weedo v. Stone - E - Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979). From
the I98Os onwards, this trend of narrowly defining the boundaries of the test
continued. See Scarfi v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 559 A.2d 459 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989).
65 On the concepts of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, see the discussion of
Hegelian perceptions in PETER SINGER, Hegel, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 339 (Paul Edwards ed. 1967) (summarizing Hegel's life,
philosophy, and impact). For more extensive treatment in PETER SINGER,
HEGEL (1983); ROBERT SOLOMON, IN THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL (1983); CHARLES
TAYLOR, HEGEL (i979); MICHAEL INWOOD, A HEGEL DICTIONARY (1992), all
of which are cited in Stempel, supra note 48.
6 JERRY, supra note 2, at 141; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at 633;
STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 313; Abraham, supra note 13, at 1153; Fischer,

supra note 49, at 161; Roger C. Henderson, The Formulation of the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside Insurance Law,
5 CONN. INS. L.J. 69(1998); Henderson, supra note 13, at 838; Stempel, supra
note 48, at 189; Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the
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It is nevertheless possible to identify a few general ways in
which states apply the test. The Reasonable Expectations test in
its "strong" form-as captured by Keeton's classic formulationprivileges the Insured's reasonable expectations above the
6
67
explicit language of the contract. The test in its "weak" form
limits itself to those cases in which the contract's text -contains
some ambiguity. The Reasonable Expectations test in its weak
sense is not intended for use in the same manner as the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule, however. Whereas the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule is applied only when the
text raises more than one reasonable interpretation and directs
courts to choose the one disfavoring the drafter, the "weak"
version of the Reasonable Expectations test is applied whenever
the text is vague, regardless of whether or not more than one
reasonable interpretation exists. A third, intermediate version of
the Reasonable Expectations test is applied when the contract's
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 296 (1998).
67 This is the classic version of the Reasonable Expectations test, also
known as "the Whole Transaction Version." See KEETON AND WIDISS, supra
note 2, at 613-652; Keeton, supra note 4. For the list of states in the United
States that have adopted this classic version of the test, a "rights at Variance"
version of it, see Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5. The following
judgments are widely cited as adopting this version: C & J. FertilizerInc., 227
N.W.2d at 169; Kievet, 17o A.2d at 22; Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western
National Mutual Insurance Co., 366 N.W.2d. 271 (Minn. 1985); Parker v.
Unum Life Insurance Co., 93o F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (D. Ariz. 1996) ("[I]n

limited situations, however, even an unambiguous term in standardized
insurance contacts will not be enforced where the insured did not reasonably
expect it."); Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa
1988). Of course, the use of this strong version of the test could lead to a ruling
that the Insured's expectations were unreasonable and therefore yield a result
contrary to the Insured's interests.
68 The weak version is called "the Ambiguity Version." For a list of states
in the United States that have adopted the test in its weak version, see
Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 353-67; Ware, supra note 6, at
1467. This version of the test is in fact the most cautious use made of the test.
See Abraham, supra note 13, at i i8i., The following cases are widely cited as
adopting this version: Dickins v. Stiles, 916 P.2d 435, 439 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996) ("[T]here must be either an ambiguity or inconsistency between policy
provisions. When this occurs, the provisions are to be interpreted in
accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured."); Silk v. Flat Top
Construction, Inc., 453 S.E.2d 356 (W. Va. 1994); Wellcome v. Home

Insurance Co., 849 P.2d 19o (Mont. 1993); Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
Young, 832 P.2d 376 (Nev. 1992); Tonkovic v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987); National Union Fire Insurance Co., v.
Reno's Executive Air Inc., 682 P.2d 138o (Nev. 1984).
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language is indeed clear but the disputed terms are nonetheless
insufficiently prominent and buried in the text, are surprising, or
are contradictory to the purpose for which the insurance
agreement was original drawn.6 9
The difference between the Reasonable Expectations test
in its "strong" and "weak" versions is that only the "strong"
version acts completely independent of the contract text and can
therefore help implement far-reaching judicial policies that
significantly deviate from the text. Thus, the strong version of the
test is not really a test in the interpretive sense at all. By contrast,
the test in its "weak" version depends on the text and as such
constitutes a true interpretive test similar to the Interpretation
Against the Drafter rule, albeit with more intrusive potential. In
fact, the weak version of the Reasonable Expectations test can to
a large extent be seen to lie within the boundaries of the
Interpretation Against the Drafter rule's more expansive
versions, some of which Kenneth Abraham originated, 70 and thus,
can be seen as merely a variant on the "Interpretation Against the
Drafter" rule. Finally, like the weak version, the intermediate
variation of the "Reasonable Expectations" test depends on the
actual text of the contract but in a looser sense as it requires
merely obscure or surprising wording rather than ambiguous
language.
3. A Critical Discussion
Surprisingly, despite frequent application of the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test over the last four
decades, one can detect no rigorous attempt to construct a
complex application model for it. The many references to the test,
whether in the case law or in scholarly articles, basically
concentrate on the same simplistic discussions of its pros and
cons. They fail to delve into the details and boundaries of the test
or its relationship with the duties of disclosure that govern
insurance transactions. As will be presented in further detail
below, this relationship has exerted a decisive influence on the
formulation of the Reasonable Expectations test, on the one hand,
69

Stempel, supra note 48, at

192;

Fischer, supra note 49, at I55; see also,

e.g., Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 9IO (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). For
other, less common variations of the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
test, see Stempel, supra note 48, at 192.
70 Abraham, supra note I2; see also supra notes 28-43 and accompanying
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and on the formulation of the duties of disclosure, on the other
hand, even though no recognized standard for applying the test
existed.
The discussion above described the possible justifications
for the Reasonable Expectations test, as well as those special
characteristics of the insurance industry that led to the
development of the test and to the development of other industryspecific principles and doctrines.7" Nonetheless, formulating a
proper standard for applying the Reasonable Expectations test
and analysis analyzing the symbiosis that exists between it and
the duties of disclosure require an examination of the possible
criticisms of the test. The proceeding discussion will therefore
present some of these criticisms.
It is possible to present these criticisms from three main
viewpoints: a comparison with the principles of contract law;
economic analysis of the law; and psychological analysis of the
law. I will discuss them in turn.
Contract Theory
The main criticism from the contract law viewpoint
asserts that widespread use of the Reasonable Expectations test
impinges on freedom of contract because it allows courts to draft
new contracts for the Insurer and the Insured, regardless of what
they had originally agreed.72 As such, the test undermines
certainty and reliance on the express wording of the contract and
thus interferes with the Insurer's ability to price insurance risk.
In the long-term, the test could therefore lead to increased
premiums and burdens on the pockets of the Insured
themselves.73 This criticism of the Reasonable Expectations of the
7' See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text; see also KEETON AND
WIDISS, supra note 2, at 634.
72 JERRY, supra note 2, at 144; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 319, 335; Fischer,
supra note 49, at I7I; Gardner, supra note 58, at 578; Lashner, supra note 59,
at II75; Mayhew, supra note 6, at 267; Harry F. Perlet, The Insurance
Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM ii6 (197I);
Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectation, 6 FORUM 252 (I97I); Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5,
at 368; Rahdert, R. E. Revisited, supra note 5, at 1I5; Stempel, supra note 48,
at 2o6; Ware, supra note 6, at 1476, 1487.
13 Id.; see also Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent
Causation and the Art of
Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985);
Fischer, supra note 2, at 1O52; Popik and Quackenbos, supra note 57, at 43132; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
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Insured test is put forth by those who caution against liberal
judicial intervention in other types of contracts as well.
Nonetheless, this criticism has even greater cogency in relation to
insurance agreements because the insurance industry relies very
heavily on its ability to appraise and price risk7 4 and uses this
information in writing policy terms and exclusions. When the
Reasonable Expectations test runs contrary to the terms of the
insurance agreement, and especially when it runs contrary to the
agreed-on level of underlying insurance coverage, it might
undermine the Insurer's pricing of the transaction.7" Along with
this criticism based on contract law, some also criticize the
judicial activism embodied in the use of the Reasonable
Expectations test for encroaching not only on legislative authority
but also on the supervisory authority of those that specifically
regulate the insurance industry and sometimes draft mandatory
insurance policy terms themselves.7 6
Economic Analysis of Law
Criticism of the Reasonable Expectations test also comes
from an economic analysis of the law. As a rule, the economic
approach encourages free-market activity, as expressed in the
principle of freedom of contract and its emphasis on party choice
and intent. Because parties' choices are perceived as joint
maximization of their respective interests, the Reasonable
YALE L.J. 1521, 1524 (1987).
74 ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at ii; COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 23, at

45-55; Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-89 (1989); Bragg, supra
note 73; Fischer, supra note 2, at 1059-64.
"s It might possibly be argued that even the use of the Reasonable
Expectations test is a kind of pricing that the Insurer could engage in before
entering into the contract, and therefore, the disruption of the pricing of the
risks due to the Reasonable Expectations test is lessened.
76 See generally J.H. BAKER, FROM SANCTITY OF CONTRACT TQ
REASONABLE

EXPECTATION IN CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS

71

(,979);

Mayhew, supra note 6; Perlet, supra note 72; Rahdert, R. E. Revisited, supra
note 5, at 136; Squires, supra note 72; Stempel, supra note 48, at 266; Ware,
supra note 6, at 1483; E. Neil Young, John R. Lewis, and J. Finley Lee,
Insurance Contract Interpretation:Issues and Trends, 625 INS. L.J. 71, 73, 7881 (1975). It must be noted that judicial intervention through the Reasonable
Expectations test differs from potential legislative intervention in the
insurance field, in that legislative intervention is usually applied prospectively,
whereas judicial intervention is of a retroactive nature and hence tends to
undermine the foundations of the transaction's pricing.
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Expectations test may very well subvert the certainty, reliance,
and planning that the contract embodies, thus lowering the
efficiency of the free market. In addition to this more general
criticism, economic analysts also challenge the various
justifications for the Reasonable Expectations test, listed above,
in an attempt to refute them one by one.77 For example,
economists question the idea that the Reasonable Expectations
test bridges over the disparity between the relative negotiating
abilities of the Insurer and the Insured, even absent bargaining
power disparities, and argue that unfair wealth distributions
should be resolved in more efficient ways such as taxation, not
contract law.7" Thus, the Reasonable Expectations test leads to an
increase in premiums and a perversion of insurance into a luxury
only the wealthy can afford.7 9 In other words, instead of
redistributing wealth and bridging the gap between the Insurer
and the Insured, the Reasonable Expectations test creates
disincentives for people to purchase insurance and lowers
efficiency. The test therefore redirects the Insured's resources
from efficient investment in both insurance and business
development to over-investment in self-defense measures, or,
even worse, to no investment in insurance at all, not even selfinsurance. 0

Another popular justification for the Reasonable
Expectations test argues that insurance agreements are for the
most part standardized contracts dictated by the Insurer. The
Insurer can therefore assert its preferences ahead of the Insured's.
The Reasonable Expectations test presumably protects the
Insured from the Insurer's power and from the unfavorable terms
that the Insurer drafts as a result.8 ' In the opinion of the
economists, however, the use of standardized contracts does not
necessarily constitute evidence that a strong Insurer has taken
advantage of an Insured consumer; rather, standardized contracts
result from a desire to mitigate transaction costs." As Michael
"' See, e.g., STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 321; Stempel, supra note 48, at 273;
Ware, supra note 6, at 1461.
"'Ware, supranote 6, at 1476.
71 See sources cited supra note 73.
o Schwartz, supra note 2, at 39-40, and sources cited therein.
II See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
82 See,

e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note io, at 295-303; JERRY, supra note 2,

at 139; KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 2, at ii8; Anderson and Fournier,
supra note 3, at 365; R. H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework:
A Comment, 17 J.L. & ECON. 493, 494 (,974); Fischer, supra note 2, at 1o12;
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Trebilcock has shown, an Insurer who is forced to sell its product
through personal negotiations with each and every Insured will
incur large costs in investigating the profitability of each sale and
in drafting each policy, costs that would ultimately burden both
parties and damage 83
the insured consumers' ability to purchase
affordable insurance.
The main criticism of economic analysis, however, focuses
on the rationale that the "Reasonable Expectations" test helps
counter-balance the Insurer's advantage in comprehending the
verbose and complex language used in insurance policies, filled
with professional terms beyond the comprehension of most
laypeople.84 For example, policies often greatly limit insurance
coverage by using exclusions of which the Insured is not aware.
The Reasonable Expectations test ostensibly was especially
designed to overcome this problem, but from an economic
analysis perspective, is not the most desirable way to solve it.
Law and economics scholars instead suggest that the Insured will
eventually be able to weed out those terms and conditions that
they find unattractive because competition in the free market will
force profit-maximizing Insurers to offer policies with more
favorable and attractive terms. This process supposedly will
continue until Insurers finally devise a policy with the optimal
terms and prices.8" Thus, any intervention through use of the
Reasonable Expectations test will only hinder this process and
interfere in those policies that have already achieved optimality
consequent to free-market competition.86
A more moderate position would qualify this criticism by
acknowledging that Insured consumers have incomplete
information regarding policy conditions and terms and that the
cost of obtaining this information frustrates their attempts to
shop for optimal policy terms. Insured consumers are not able to
discern which policies have attractive and unattractive terms
Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?- Inductions
from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-PartyInsurance Contracts,
65 CORNELL L. REV. 330, 345(1979); Kessler, supra note 47, at 631-32;
Mayhew, supra note 6, at 270; Rakoff, supra note 3, at 1220-25; Squires, supra
note 72, at 253; Ware, supra note 6, at 1477.
83 M. J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of BargainingPower: PostBenthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 364
(1976); see also sources cited supra note 82.
' See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
85 Coase, supra note 82, at 494; Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 2 11(973).
86 For elaboration on this issue, see Ware, supra note 6, at 1478.
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anyway. Therefore, the optimal standardized contract will never
evolve, even in the presence of free-market competition.87 Such
competition will affect only relative price, a parameter that
consumers can identify and compare, but the lowest competitive
price will probably involve a reduction in insurance coverage as
well, a parameter that competition cannot affect because
information about it is inaccessible."8 In response, some have
argued that Insurers will voluntarily provide insured consumers
with information about any unfavorable terms in their
competitors' insurance products, and thus, the Insured's cost of
obtaining information will remain low.8 9 Moreover, risk-averse
consumers will be willing, during times of high uncertainty, to
pay more for uncomplicated policies and thus counteract
Insurers' incentives to create complex policies.90 Essentially,
economic analysts claim that there is no room for the Reasonable
Expectations test, not even to cope with the complexities and
inter-party disparities of policy design, because free-market
competition and reputation effects will resolve these problems
more efficiently.
Psychological Analysis of the Law
Psychological analysis of law also concludes that no real
weight should be given to the Reasonable Expectations test but
for reasons different from those given by economists. Instead,
psychological analysis suggests that an inherent conceptual
inability prevents consumers in general, and insured consumers
in particular, from having any "reasonable expectations" at all. In
other words, insured consumers' limited knowledge and cognitive
biases preclude them from making educated decisions about
insurance purchases, even when they are provided with complete
information. Hence, the search for the reasonable expectations
of the insured is invariably futile. All judges can do, therefore, is
87Goldberg,

supra note 3, at 461, 485; Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde,

Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis,
88

127

U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (I979).

Trebilcock, supra note 83, at 364-65.

s See sources cited supra note 85.
90Ware, supra note 6, at I480.
91 Thomas, supra note 66. On cognitive biases and their influence on the

design of legal tests, see the discussion on the theoretical basis of the Insurer's
duty of disclosure, Thomas, supra note 66, Ch.i notes 135-26o and
accompanying text.
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rely on their own reasonable expectations.
II. THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERPRETATION
RULES AND THE INSURER'S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN INSURANCE
SETTINGS

After having extensively discussed both the duties of
disclosure and the rules of interpretation that apply to insurance
contracts, in this Part, I discuss the symbiotic relationship
between the disclosure doctrine and the interpretation doctrine.
In general, both the duties of disclosure and the rules of
interpretation applicable in the insurance industry were
formulated to respond to the complexities inherent in insurance
transactions, the common denominator among which is the fact
that insurance products are abstract and intangible. The Insured
first sees the insurance contract only after entering into it, so the
contract includes terms that the Insurer, as the more powerful
party, dictates. The insured consumer, in turn, usually has no
choice but to accept these dictated terms. As a consequence,
insured consumers are often unaware of all of the terms and
conditions of the transaction, particularly those worded in an
obscure way and riddled with professional argot." Both the
disclosure doctrine and the rules of interpretation can be seen as
tools courts can employ to cope with these immanent complexities
and to commute insurance transactions, whether in advance or in
retrospect, into transactions that emulate as much as possible
sales of products that consumers understand. In other words,
rules on disclosure and contract interpretation help turn the
rather abstract and abstruse insurance product into a more
concrete and straightforward product that reflects the apparent
intent of the parties.93
The most obvious connection between the doctrines of
disclosure and interpretation is that the Interpretation Against
the Drafter and Reasonable Expectations of the Insured doctrines
give Insurers an incentive to provide their Insureds with more
detailed and more accurate information. Insurers can thereby
transmute the Insureds' reasonable but as yet unascertained
expectations into their actual expectations, so that, consequent to
the Insurer's compliance with its duties of disclosure and
verification, the Insured now have an actual awareness of the
92

See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.

93 Id.
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terms and conditions of their insurance policies.94 Thus, the
Reasonable Expectations test and the Interpretation Against the
Drafter rule presumably lead to greater transfers of information
such that the expectations of the Insured match the expectations
of the Insurer. Moreover, the more information the insured
consumers have, the more intelligent consumers they become,
which ultimately increases the level of competition within the
insurance industry itself. This, in turn, leads to the eventual
adoption of optimally efficient insurance policies that confer
maximal benefits on both parties to the transaction. 9
Moreover, the duties of disclosure and the rules of
interpretation complement one another, in that they foster
certainty at both ends of the insurance transaction. While
certainty in advance of an insurance sale is fostered by the duties
of disclosure, certainty in retrospect is fostered by the interpretive
rules, particularly the Reasonable Expectations test, which
bridges the gap between what the Insured expected to receive and
what the Insurer actually sold him.96 Both the duties of disclosure
and the rules of interpretation help. the Insurer redistribute the
cost of liability in a more efficient manner because insured
consumers receive, either in advance via their own informed
choices or in retrospect via the court's intercession, insurance
packages that better fit their needs. Thus, risk will be more
accurately redistributed over the entire community of insured
consumers, and insurance policies arising from inefficient
insurance transactions will be weeded out of the market.97 These
supra note

12, at 349; JERRY, supra note 2, at 146; KEETON
at 642; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 321; Abraham,
note
2,
AND WIDISS, supra
supra note 13, at 1169-74.

CLARKE,

9'As described, the advantage for the Insured is the generally increased
consumer awareness of the nature of the transaction into which they are
entering, which in turn leads to the development of a competitive market. As a
result, Insurers will develop improved policies to meet the needs of such a
competitive market because the Insured consumers now deal with a more
tangible, comprehensible good that they can examine and which they will
want to obtain for minimal cost. The advantage to the Insurer in imposing the
duty of disclosure in this context is that he will be able to price his risks in a
way that reflects the insurance good that he actually sells, without being
exposed to the disruption of this pricing by external intervention by the courts,
who would be unable to resort to the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
test as a result of the Insurer's disclosures.
96 See sources cited supra note 94; see also Fischer, supra note 2, at 997.
9' STEMPEL, supra note
supra note 6, at 1476.

2,

at 321; Abraham, supra note 13, at I185; Ware,
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two points suggest that the duties of disclosure and the rules of
interpretation are compatible and complement one another. Both
serve to reshape insurance into a less abstract and more
comprehensible product and to foster certainty and efficient
distribution of liability costs among the entire community of
insured consumers.
Nonetheless, another side to the coin exists. The rules of
interpretation, and the Reasonable Expectations test in
particular, encourage Insurers to provide the Insureds with
information and thus obviate recourse to the Reasonable
Expectations test. Indeed, inasmuch as they receive more
information, the expectations of insured consumers do become
more realistic and concrete. In certain cases, then, Insurers can
curtail the courts' ability to intervene, and as a result, insured
consumers will not be able to obtain the full protection of the
courts' interpretive rules. Because they enter into insurance
transactions supposedly enabled to make educated choices,
insured consumers cannot plead ignorance of the terms of their
insurance policies.9 8 In this situation, the courts will still be asked
to protect the realistic expectations of the Insured and will have
to use more intrusive and less "analytical" doctrines to intervene
in the contract, such as public welfare and the disparate
bargaining positions inherent in standardized contracts.99
Furthermore, the cognitive failures from which Insured
consumers suffer will likely prevent them from fully internalizing,
processing, and rationally using information even when they do
receive it. This in turn will likely cause market failures and a
98

It seems that Insured consumers can be assumed to have actual, fully

internalized expectations only as to that portion of the insurance policy dealing
with the amount of their premiums and maybe even their insurance ceiling
and deductible, at most. As for all other details of the insurance policy, Insured
consumers are assumed to have no actual expectations, even after the Insured
satisfies its duty of disclosure, because of the cognitive restrictions discussed
above. Thus, the Reasonable Expectations test is designed to cover this portion
of the insurance policy not internalized into the awareness of the Insured, even
if the Insurer has a duty to disclose it. This latter portion includes definitions of
the insured against events and any exclusions to insurance coverage.
9' Nevertheless, and as stated above, it is possible that market powers will
act such that the Insured consumer, now a very. well-informed consumer after
the Insurers fulfill their rather exacting duties of disclosure, will wield the
power to choose between various competitive alternatives based on the
information the Insurers provide. As a result of this heightened market
competition, Insurers will then focus on offering better insurance policy
packages with more favorable terms and more extensive coverage with fewer
exclusions.
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deficiency of proper insurance coverage in certain sectors. 00
Thus, in certain cases the relationship between the duties of
disclosure and the rules of interpretation will be such that one
makes the other unnecessary: the Insurer who satisfies its duty of
disclosure thereby limits the protection the Insured can seek
under the rules of interpretation.
In endeavoring to construct a model of the doctrines of
disclosure and interpretation, however, we can also gain some
inspiration from examining these doctrines from the perspective
of contract and tort law. The mutual duties of disclosure imposed
on both parties to an insurance contract assume that both are
capable of exchanging information. This assumption of mutual
exchange is an integral part of "contractual" thinking, according
to which parties can allocate and price risks based on the
information they both possess at the time of contract formation.
In this way, however, the interpretation doctrines more closely
reflect a tort law thought process. This "tort law" thinking
recognizes the fact that in most insurance transactions, the
negotiations between the parties as to details of coverage and its
exclusions almost do not exist; instead, the Insurer simply dictates
the policy to the Insured.' 0' Thus, negotiations cannot aid in the
evaluation of risk and the determination of coverage in each and
every case. To this the Insured's cognitive limitations also add
10 2
further difficulties.
All of this leads to the conclusion that insurance
transactions reflect more than just any contract negotiations that
might, or might not, have taken place when the Insured first
purchased the insurance coverage. Rather, the transaction
extends over the entire period of time for which the Insured
bought coverage, recalling the fact that insurance contracts are
relational, not transactional, contracts. Indeed, the first
substantive opportunity for the parties to meet and actually
exchange information, at least from the insured consumer's point
of view, most often does not come until the insured-against event
finally occurs. That is to say, when a liability-causing event
occurs and the parties meet in their first substantive encounter,
the insured consumer often expects to be covered for the full
extent of the damage, based on the information that the insured
100

On cognitive biases, see supra note 9I.

101 On the influence of insurance contract characteristics, including the
Insured's inability to negotiate with the Insurer, and the formulation of rules
of interpretation and discovery, see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
'02 On cognitive biases, see supra note 9i.
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consumer possesses up to that point. The insured consumer buys
insurance coverage for a particular kind of liability, and therefore
in the framework of her expectations, she believes that she has
coverage for the full extent of that liability and does not take any
exclusions into account.103 In fact, this "tort like" situation
underlies the creation of the Reasonable Expectations of the
Insured test because it allows courts to control insurance
coverage retroactively when the parties never truly negotiated
over the scope of the coverage prospectively. As compared to
contract law, in which parties themselves often are found later to
re-evaluate and re-price risk, this type of retroactive judicial
intervention typifies tort law. Courts can resolve cases according
to their own judicial policies, whereas exclusive reliance on the
duties of disclosure would lead courts to resolve disputes on a
purely factual basis. 04
What, then, should the standard for applying the rules of
interpretation in insurance transactions be? And how will their
symbiotic relationship with the Insurer's duty to disclose
influence the formulation of the interpretation model? Now, after
the relevant aspects of the duties of disclosure and the rules of
interpretation have been discussed, it is possible to try and
establish such a model. Within the framework of an interpretive
model, reference can be made both to the "Interpretation Against
the Drafter" rule and the "Reasonable Expectations" test, as well
as to additional interpretive rules. The scope of application of all
these rules can also be examined, along with the normative
hierarchy among them, within the larger framework of a more
general contractual interpretation macro-model.

III. TOWARD A NEW INTERPRETIVE

APPROACH

A. The Insurance Contract InterpretationHierarchy
The interpretation hierarchy of insurance contracts is
usually structured in the following manner:
The insurance contract shall be interpreted according to
103

Id.

'0o The external intervention and dictation of policy through the use of the

Reasonable Expectations test is also similar to tort law because tort law
embodies a protection of public interests as perceived by the legislature and
the court, whereas contract law reflects the interests and values of the parties
as perceived by the parties themselves. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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its purpose, that is, according to the intent of the parties.
"Purpose" is a term with two meanings, subjective purpose and
objective purpose. The contract shall be interpreted first and
foremost according to its subjective purpose, namely, according
to the joint subjective intent of the parties and what those
specific parties actually meant. 0 The subjective purpose of the
insurance contract is inferred from its language or from the
0 6
surrounding circumstances.
If, however, the joint subjective intent of the parties to the
contract cannot be inferred, the interpretation shall proceed to the
next stage and examine the joint objective purpose of the parties.
"Objective" purpose refers to the purpose that is typically thought
to take into account those interests acceptable to decent or
reasonable parties, as distinguished from the parties to the
specific insurance contract in question. Customarily, the
subjective purpose of an insurance contract is considered difficult
to determine because insurance contracts usually follow the
format of standard insurance policies and are not personally
negotiated and therefore not "tailored" to the specific interests of
the Insured. For the most part, insurance contracts will therefore
be interpreted according to the mutual objective intent of the
parties.
When no mutual objective purpose can be identified, the
court shall resolve the dispute according to the "Interpretation
against the Drafter" rule; that is, the dispute shall, for the most
part, be resolved against the Insurer and in favor of the Insured.
The "Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule' can be
105That is to say, the joint subjective intent depends on what the specific
parties at hand intended, as distinguished from what reasonable parties in the

same situation would have done.
106 There are those who believe that the relationship between the language
of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the contract parallels the
relationship between the two stages of contract interpretation, such that the
language of the contract is decisive in the first stage when its wording is clear
and does not ostensibly lead to an absurd result. When, and only when, the
contract wording is not so clear, however, will reference be made to the
circumstances surrounding the contract. By contrast, there are those who view
both the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding it as a
single normative hierarchy, according to which both the circumstances and the
language of the contract are examined as a single interpretive bloc. Should the
language and circumstances of the contract contradict one another, the
circumstances will prevail as the more accurate indication of the parties' state

of mind. For a more on the different relevant schools of thought on contract
interpretation in the United States, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying

text.

2008]

INTERP. AND DISCL. IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS

141

conceived of as a "last resort" rule of interpretation; one that is
employed only after the other interpretational rules listed above
have been exhausted. In addition, other rules of interpretation
have been formulated, which some insurance scholars refer to as
independent rules. Under these rules any coverage exclusions that
appear in an insurance policy shall be narrowly construed, while
grants of coverage shall be broadly construed. 17 These rules can
therefore be seen as industry-specific derivations of the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule and should not
necessarily be viewed as independent. Note also that the
hierarchy above does not include the Reasonable Expectations of
the Insured test that often favors the Insured despite the explicit
language of its insurance policy. Moreover, the hierarchy is
schematic and does not exhaust the mutual interaction of the
various principles, doctrines, and rules that affect the
interpretation of the insurance contract. The hierarchy also does
not illustrate the reciprocal relationship between these principles
and doctrines and the normative hierarchy into which they fall,
nor does the hierarchy take into account the effect it might have
on the Insurer's duty of disclosure. The discussion will therefore
concentrate on those cases that implicate both the "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" and the "Reasonable Expectations" doctrines
in order to determine how to apply them, both alone and in
conjunction with the Insurer's duty of disclosure. The discussion
will first address the application of the "Interpretation Against
the Drafter" rule and then the "Reasonable Expectations" test.
Then, it will focus on the strategic positions of both within the
contract interpretation scheme.
B. The InterpretationAgainst the DrafterRule - An Applied

Model
A condition precedent for applying the "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" rule is textual ambiguity, as seen from the
perspective of the reasonable reader and not the Insurer. This
ambiguity is likely to appear in the terms or the internal structure
of the agreement. Classic application of the rule should be
obtained only in those cases in which the insurance text raises
several possible interpretations of equal reasonableness. In these
cases, as a matter of fairness, the Insurer logically should bear the
liability as the party at fault for, and as the least-cost avoider of,
107

See supra notes

19-2o

and accompanying text.
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the ambiguity; as the party with the deeper pocket and the most
efficient means for redistributing the cost; and lastly, as the
stronger party to the negotiation and the party that drafted the
standardized contract.10 Moreover, the procedural advantage of
the rule in these cases is that it usually does not involve factual
clarification. The inherent disadvantage of this rule, however, is
that it presumably distances the court's decision from the intent
of the parties and leaves a certain sense of arbitrariness in its
application. The cases typically applying the "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" rule are those that follow this classic
example, that is, those in which the text is receptive to multiple
interpretations of equal reasonableness. 9 Nonetheless, one of the
challenges that courts avoid confronting is the set of cases in
which alternative interpretations are not equally reasonable. This
set of cases includes those in which the interpretation that tends
to favor the Insurer is also the most reasonable interpretation, as
well as those in which the text does not seem vague at all. Even in
these cases, courts will tend to interpret the insurance contract in
favor of the Insured. The courts do so either because they believe
that all ambiguities, even those that tend to favor the Insurer,
should be interpreted to the detriment of the Insurer, or because
courts create ambiguity out of thin air, where it does not
necessarily exist, in order to find in favor of the Insured.' 10
In a proper model of the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule, a more expansive use of it is possible, but only when taking
into consideration the following: As a rule, it is indeed
appropriate to apply the Interpretation Against the Drafter rule
in cases of textual ambiguity, especially where the text admits of a
number of equally reasonable interpretations. The basic
rationales that underlie the rule easily justify such an application,
both separately and together, and the liability to be imposed on
the Insurer in such cases is in fact absolute liability. By contrast,
when insurance policies contain terms that are indeed vague but
whose more reasonable interpretations favor the Insurer, courts
should also determine the Insurer's level of fault in drafting the
text, particularly as to whether the Insurer could have drafted the
text in a less vague manner. The standard by which to measure
the ambiguity of the policy's text and the Insurer's ability to draft

,o On the justifications for applying the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule, see supranotes i-i 1, 28-33 and accompanying text.
9 See sources cited supra note 107.
...See sources cited supra note 22.
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clearer alternatives must take into account the information the
Insurer had at the time it drafted the policy or at the time the
insured-against event occurred. I l l If the Insurer could have
drafted the policy in less ambiguous terms based on the
information it had at either point in time, the "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" rule should apply. If, however, the text could
not have been worded in a less ambiguous manner, the courts
could conceivably carve out an exemption for the Insurer because
it was not at fault.
underlying the
Nonetheless, the other rationales
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule will still warrant
consideration of additional factors before the courts can exempt
the Insurer from liability. One such consideration looks at
whether most insured consumers would have agreed ex ante to
higher insurance premiums in exchange for the disputed
insurance coverage the ambiguous text addresses.112 If the answer
to this question is in the affirmative and most insured consumers
would willingly have paid higher premiums in order to remove
doubts as to the covered risk, then the Insurer should bear the
liability. Conversely, if most Insured consumers would not have
paid the extra premium, the scales tip in favor of the Insurer and
he should be exempted from liability for the textual ambiguity.
The advantages of this more complex model are that it is less
arbitrary and reflects to a greater extent the intent of the parties.
In other words, a model of the "Interpretation Against the
Drafter" rule that considers both the Insurer's level of fault and
the Insured's willingness to pay for extended coverage returns to
contract-law analysis in that it takes into account the joint
objective purpose of the parties. Such a model thus employs the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule as a rule of discretion
and not as a last resort rule of decision placed at the bottom of
the interpretation hierarchy to absolve the courts from resolving
insurance disputes discretionarily.113 The disadvantage of such a
complex model, however, lies in the procedural difficulties of
determining both the Insurer's level of fault in drafting
ambiguous policy terms and the reasonable insured consumer's
willingness to pay higher premiums. The absolute-liability
version of the "Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule, by

1" See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
113 This description of the rule does not consider the cognitive biases
mentioned in note 91 supra.
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contrast, makes the costs of such determinations unnecessary.
Notably, certain kinds of textual ambiguity can be weeded
out in the preliminary stages, before resorting to the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule. Whenever textual
ambiguity arises, courts could examine the rationales that
underlie and possibly explain the disputed textual ambiguity and
could thereby eliminate the need to apply the rule. Relevant
considerations in ascertaining theses rationales include: what led
the Insurer to draft the term or condition in dispute; whether the
term or condition derived from the Insurer's evaluation and
pricing of risk; and whether the circumstances under which the
insured-against event actually occurred comport with or
confound those envisioned by the Insurer at the time it priced the
risk and drafted the policy. Thus, if the actual circumstances
under which the insurance event occurred do not contradict or
negate the Insurer's considerations when originally pricing the
risk of the event, the court should interpret the text to the
detriment of the Insurer.
For example, imagine an insurance policy against burglary
that covers only burglaries accompanied by force, but the parties
disagree on whether the insurance coverage includes burglaries
not accompanied by force.114 First, the court should identify what
motivated the Insurer to offer coverage only for those burglaries
accompanied by force. Possible rationales might include the
Insurer's wish to eliminate incentives for the Insured to stage her
own burglaries, by conditioning coverage upon signs of force. The
Insurer might also have wished to encourage the Insured to take
more precautions. For example, if the Insured is aware that only
burglaries by force are covered, she will be certain not to handle
the keys to her premises in an unsupervised manner because
illegal entry with a key would not qualify as "accompanied by
force." The Insured might also take more care to close and secure
all windows and doors and might even install additional security
measures. In other words, the Insurer priced the risks with these
rationales in mind and therefore drafted the text to reflect the fact
that it would cover only those burglaries accompanied by force. If
it becomes apparent, however, that the Insured did not in fact
stage the burglary, and that the burglars instead broke into the
business by circumventing the security devices and leaving no
signs of force, the Insurer should not be able to hide behind the
14

271.

These were the facts in the case of Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N'W. at
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contract's text to avoid covering the burglary. Because the
Insured took proper security measures and because no staged
burglary occurred, the Insurer achieved the purpose of its
"accompanied by force" limitation. When the insured-against
event materializes, the Insurer's rationale in drafting the
ambiguous text at issue still remains, and the factors on which the
Insurer relied in pricing the risk are left intact and
uncontradicted, the Insurer has no grounds on which to ask for
exemption from paying the appropriate insurance benefits, even
though the text itself might indicate otherwise. Holding the text
dispositive in such cases yields a random and arbitrary result, not
a result consistent with the underlying risks. 115 Thus, a
preliminary determination of the fundamental rationales for the
text at issue will likely eliminate the need to discuss its ambiguity
or to use the "Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule. The
advantage of such a determination, particularly when the
rationales are immediately clear, is that the resulting decision is
less arbitrary and more closely matches the joint objective
purpose of the parties, without recourse to rules of last resort such
as "Interpretation Against the Drafter."
C. InterpretationAgainst the Drafterin Conjunction with the
Duty of Disclosure
In formulating an appropriate
model for the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule, the extent to which the
Insurer complies with its duty of disclosure can be taken into
account. An inverse correlation can be created between the two,
so that the greater the Insurer's compliance with its duty of
disclosure, the less courts need resort to the Interpretation
Against the Drafter rule, and vice versa. An Insurer who
complies with its duty of disclosure, with respect to the insurance
contract, effectively changes the Insured's resulting knowledge
into the external circumstances surrounding the insurance
contract. This places their dispute at the top of the interpretation
scheme, where the joint subjective purpose of the parties is
dispositive. In other words, by complying with its duty of
disclosure, the Insurer clarifies its understanding of what the

115 On the public status of an Insurer and the unseemliness of appearing to
be arbitrary, see Fischer, supra note 2, at 1044-1046, and the references cited
therein.
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insurance policy means, 1 '6 so that both the Insurer and the
Insured now have the same subjective (actual) understanding of
it. The information that the Insurer imparts to the Insured
pursuant to the Insurer's duty of disclosure thus becomes part of
the external circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract.We can see that the Interpretation Against the Drafter
rule creates potential incentives for the Insurer to comply with its
duty of disclosure in order to avoid being subject to a contract
interpretation contrary to its interests.
D. The Reasonable Expectations Test - An Applied Model
As discussed above, the Reasonable Expectations test can
take one of three main forms: weak, intermediate, or strong. 117 In
its weak version the test resembles the Interpretation Against the
Drafter rule, namely, by requiring textual ambiguity as a
condition precedent to its application, but is also distinguishable
from Interpretation Against the Drafter in that it applies to text
of any degree of vagueness and to interpretations of any degree of
reasonability. Stretching the borders of Interpretation Against the
Drafter would lead to a similar result, however, so the weak
version of the Reasonable Expectations test appears to offer no
unique advantages. This Part will therefore show that the weak
version does not embody the purposes for which the Reasonable
Expectations test was developed. The intermediate and strong
versions of the Reasonable Expectations test, however, apply
even in contradiction to explicit text, although the point of
departure for the intermediate version is hidden or surprising
contract terms that run contrary to the basic purpose of the
insurance policy. The strong version, on the other hand, applies
regardless of whether the text is either explicit or sufficiently
prominent.1 Nonetheless, even the weak form of the Reasonable
See sources cited supra note I07.
See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
118 There are those who say that the Reasonable Expectations test in its
intermediate and strong versions does not act as a test of interpretation, but
rather as a principle that comes into play only after the interpretation rules
have been exhausted. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 6o. The Reasonable
Expectations test in its strong version differs from the unconscionability
principle in that the unconscionability principle is more limited than the
Reasonable Expectations test. Unconscionablility requires a factual
determination that the Insurer knew that the Insured would have rejected the
insurance policy had it been aware of its restrictive terms, whereas the
Reasonable Expectations test is not conditioned upon the knowledge of the
16
117
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Expectations test may still be preferable to its "Interpretation
Against the Drafter" alternative because it is more closely cabined
and restricted to the objective expectations of at least of one of the
parties to the contract. As such, the Reasonable Expectations test
may be less arbitrary than the "last resort" Interpretation Against
the Drafter rule.
The various applications of the versions described above
nevertheless do not clarify why the test pertains only to the
Insured's reasonable expectations and what the role the Insurer's
reasonable expectations might have. It is also unclear where the
Reasonable Expectations test should be placed within the
interpretation hierarchy presented above, as well as what
reciprocal relationships it might have with the Insurer's duty of
disclosure. This Part will therefore show that the following
hierarchy of considerations should be taken into account when
using the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test:
To what extent does the Insured have actual, concrete
expectations? Usually, the actual expectations of the specific
Insured in question will make irrelevant the reasonable
expectations that a hypothetical Insured in the same situation
would have had; that is to say, the Insured's actual "subjective"
expectations will override his putative "objective" expectations,
such that an Insured who actually knows that he does not in fact
have a particular kind of insurance coverage cannot claim
entitlement to that coverage just because a reasonable, but
Insurer. In other words, the Insurer's compliance with its duties of disclosure
and verification make it impossible for the Insured to rely on the
unconscionability principle and thereby escape the literal terms of the
insurance policy. Assuming that the unconscionability principle is subject to
good faith, another difference between the Reasonable Expectations and
unconscionability principles is that unconscionability can be affected by the
cognitive capacities of the parties in order to decide whether the parties acted
in good faith, whereas the Reasonable Expectations test is not subject to
considerations of good faith but only to those of public interest: insofar as the
State has an interest in insurance goods as a staple commodity, it will make
judicial use of the Reasonable Expectations principle. Another way of looking
at the difference between the Reasonable Expectations and unconscionability
principles is to note that when the courts look at the Insured's reasonable
expectations in cases of market failure, they does not look at the specific
parties to the dispute but rather at the entire universe of Insurers and Insureds.
The unconscionability principle, by contrast, focuses only on the individual
parties before the court and on their specific cognitive capacities and factual
understandings. A final way of comparing the two doctrines is to view the
unconscionability principle as a test remaining within the confines of contract
law, while the Reasonable Expectations test is mostly non-contractual.
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presumably uninformed, Insured in the same situation would
have expected that kind of coverage. Here, too, a relationship
exists between the Reasonable Expectations test and the Insurer's
duty of disclosure because the test will likely give an Insurer
incentives to fully disclose all information to the Insured: an
Insured consumer whom the Insurer has fully informed has only
actual, subjective expectations and therefore cannot invoke the
Reasonable Expectations test. As will be discussed below,
however, courts may nevertheless overlook an Insurer's efforts to
avoid the Reasonable Expectations test, despite the fact that the
Insured actually knows the extent of his insurance coverage,
when a dispute nevertheless arises because of a market failure or
otherwise would lead to a market failure if resolved without
recourse to the Reasonable Expectations test. In other words,
even when, the Insured consumer should have had concrete
expectations compatible with those of his Insurer and with the
text of his insurance contract, he may still be awarded the
insurance coverage he seeks -because of overriding judicial
policies." 9
The Reasonable Expectations test will likely apply, even
when an insurance policy is otherwise explicit and unambiguous,
whenever the Insured is not aware that the text includes terms
and conditions that are surprising, that frustrate the basic
purpose of the insurance policy, or that lead to an absurd result
and give the Insurer an unfair advantage.
One can also formulate auxiliary tests that would allow
courts to apply the Reasonable Expectations test, despite the
limitations listed above. Such auxiliary rules would take into
consideration issues such as the following:
To what extent did the Insurer reasonably assume that the
Insured would not have entered into the insurance contract had
the Insured known about the problematic terms and conditions
originally incorporated into the contract? In this case, the court
should look not just at the reasonable expectations of the Insured
but also at the reasonableness of the Insurer's conduct and
expectations.
The Insurer's reasonable expectations can also be
influenced by the nature of the Insured's reasonable expectations.
For instance, what an Insurer can reasonably expect from an
insured business customer is different from what it can
For an example of cases in which there are market failures that the
Reasonable Expectations test can address, see Abraham, supra note 5.
119
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reasonably expect from an insured consumer.12 ° When dealing
with an insured consumer, the Insurer should attribute to the
Insured a broader reasonable expectation of insurance coverage,
customer's reasonable expectations are
but an insured business
12 1
likely to be different.
Furthermore, courts should view a contract's terms and
conditions in light of the underlying rationales, just as they might
do under the Interpretation Against the Drafter rule. 122 In other
words, courts should give no force to terms and conditions that
provide Insurers with an'inappropriate advantage in those cases
where the insured-against event occurs under circumstances that
do not derogate from the Insurer's reasonable expectations at the
time of drafting the contract. If the Insurer's original pricing of
risk still applies, despite the circumstances that actually
materialized, then the Insurer should not be able to rely on a
literal reading of the contract's terms and conditions to escape
liability. Not only do these terms and conditions not comply with
the reasonable expectations of the Insured, they also do not
comply, on the merits, with the reasonable expectations of the
Insurer at the time it drafted them.
In this context the Reasonable Expectations test
120

On the distinction between the consumer Insured and the business

Insured in terms of applying the various interpretation tests, see, e.g.,
ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 1o3; JERRY, supra note 2, at 145; OSTRAGER AND
NEWMAN, supra note I3, at 26; STEMPEL, supra note 2, at 325; Fischer, supra
note 2, at 1034; David B. Goodwin, Disputing insurance Coverage Disputes,
43 STAN. L. REV. 779, 796 (1991); Barry R. Ostrager and David W. Ichel,
Should the Business Insurance Policy be Construed Against the Insurer?
Another Look at the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 33 FED'N INS. COUNS.
Q. 273 (1983); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the 'Sophisticated'Policyholder
Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993);
Ware, supra note 6, at 1466.
121 For example, a volunteer association insured against burglary will
enjoy a reasonable expectation of broader insurance coverage, which in turn
leads interpretation of the "penetration by way of force" requirement to require
only minimal force to satisfy it. The Insurer of a business Insured, on the other
hand, is entitled to expect that it will take the proper security measures against
penetration, so that the risk that Insurer takes upon himself is limited to
penetration by way of actual force. It is important to emphasize, however, that
the distinction between the consumer Insured and the business Insured is not
drawn on the basis of their respective professional skills in understanding their
insurance policies or their respective economic negotiation strengths, although
some scholars suggest that these distinctions should serve as a basis for
differing duties of disclosure and rules of interpretation consumer and business
insurance policies.
122 See supra notes 37-42, 116-25 and accompanying text.
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effectively functions in the zone between a specific and focused
doctrine and the kind of abstract super-principle that courts can
use to dictate judicial policy. Where the text is unambiguous, the
Reasonable Expectations test operates at a level above the
"Interpretation Against the Drafter" rule'23 because the
"Reasonable Expectations" test becomes, to a great extent, more
of a non-interpretation principle employed only after the local
insurance contract interpretation rules have been exhausted.
Nonetheless, a relatively temperate use of the Reasonable
Expectations Test, especially one that focuses not only on the
reasonable expectations of the Insured but also on the viewpoint
of the Insurer, may still be placed within the hierarchical
interpretation scheme. This fact serves as a point of departure for
the following discussion because the temperate version of the
Reasonable Expectations test takes into account, albeit indirectly,
the apparent intent of the parties. As such, the Reasonable
Expectations test can be located in the interpretational hierarchy
at the level where the mutual objective purpose of the Insured
and Insurer is ascertained.
E. The Reasonable Expectations Test in Conjunction with the
Duty of Disclosure
The question of exactly what relationship exists between
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test and the Insurer's
duties of disclosure and verification still remains open. This
question arises even more sharply because of-the frequent mix in
insurance caselaw between court decisions that are based on the
disclosure doctrine and decisions that are based on interpretative
doctrines. The appropriate relationship between these two
doctrines that serve to expand the Insurer's liability conforms to
a dual-stage model. In the first stage, the court determines
whether the Insurer satisfied its duties of disclosure and
verification. Generally, if the Insurer has indeed satisfied its
disclosure duties, the court will disregard the reasonable
expectations otherwise attributable to the Insured and look only
at his concrete expectations. Yet, as a practical matter, the
Insurer's compliance with its duties of disclosure and verification
is often difficult to determine.
123

Anderson and Fournier, supra note 3, at 342; Henderson, supra note 66,

at 72; Jerry, supra note 13, at 37; Rahdert, R. E. Reconsidered, supra note 5, at
327; Ware, supra note 6, at 1465.
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Nonetheless, from both a substantive and a procedural
perspective, the Insurer's compliance with its duties of disclosure
is clearly germane to resolution of insurance disputes over the
policy text. Because of the inherent difficulties of ascertaining
compliance, however, courts in practice often examine first what
they should more appropriately save for the second stage; that is,
courts move on to the interpretive doctrines, including the
Reasonable Expectations test, rather than the disclosure
doctrines. It is much more appealing to resolve disputes by
skipping ahead to the second stage, even though adequate first
stage analysis would often make such analyses superfluous.
Decisions made on interpretive bases enable courts to avoid
lengthy and costly factual determinations, and, more importantly,
rules of interpretation, particularly the Reasonable Expectations
test, allow courts significant leeway to invoke whatever judicial
policies they deem appropriate.
Only in rare cases, therefore, will the Insurer be able to
prove that the Insured's concrete expectations should take
precedence over whatever reasonable expectations would
otherwise be attributed to the Insured, that is, the expectations of
a reasonable but not necessarily fully informed Insured. Courts
instead tend to turn immediately to the rules of interpretation
without first determining the Insurer's level of compliance with
its duties. This being the case, the Reasonable Expectations test
will likely continue to hold its strategic position in the
interpretation
hierarchy.
Nevertheless,
the
Reasonable
Expectations test will also likely continue to function as a broad
and non-interpretive super-principle, particularly when used to
overcome market failures. Market failures in this context refer to
those situations in which, without judicial intervention through
application of the Reasonable Expectations principle, either
insured consumers would systematically lack appropriate
insurance coverage or Insurers would systematically have to
provide the disputed level of insurance coverage, no matter what
the underlying facts were. 2 4 Regardless of what the insurance
An example of market failures are those countries in which there is no
meaningful health insurance. In these countries, the natural gap between the
Insurer and the Insured leads to the downfall of the insurance market. The
Insured prefers to have as much health insurance coverage as possible, but the
Insurer prefers to spend as little as possible paying for Insured's health care.
As a result, the Insured is willing to offer only coverage for only the least
expensive medical care, which also tends to be the most inferior care, so the
Insured will more likely than not find it not worth her while to buy health
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contract actually stipulates in such cases, the Reasonable
Expectations principle functions as a mechanism through which
the courts correct market failures by judicially awarding or
denying insurance coverage. In such cases courts will not even
look at the issues of disclosure, verification, or the actual
expectations of either the Insured or Insurer, but instead will use
the Reasonable Expectations test as a super-principle to affect
nationwide policies and regulate relationships between Insureds
12
and Insurers in the private market. 1
Ostensibly, the Reasonable Expectations principle in the
context of market failures does not function within the hierarchy
of contract interpretation rules but rather, lies outside of it. From
a more abstract point of view, however, we can still place the
Reasonable Expectations test as applied to market failures within
a framework based on the collective expectations of reasonable
Insureds and Insurers nationwide. In the long run, this broader
viewpoint inures to the benefit of both communities, the
community of insured consumers and the community of insurers
as businesses, because it protects and regulates the interests and
expectations of both communities. On the one hand, courts can
protect the legitimate interests of the Insured who buy insurance
coverage and thereby serve the interests of the Insured
community more generally by reinforcing their trust in insurance
as a concept. On the other hand, courts can also protect the
interests and expectations of Insurers as a business community by
awarding insurance coverage only within the borders of what
Insurers can pay for and yet remain financially viable.12 6 The
overall result is -that the reasonable expectations of both the
insurance. This obviously runs contrary to the national interest and thus
constitutes an outright market failure, which, without the intervention of the
State either through legislation or judicial decree, cannot be remedied.
The same is true but in the opposite direction in the field of tort insurance for
environmental damage. Here, market failure is likely to lead to the collapse of
Insurers because the Insured's expectations will often far surpass the Insurer's
financial ability to meet those expectations. Therefore, courts will tend to
lower the standard of the Insured's reasonable expectations. For example,
Insureds cannot reasonably expect coverage for daily air pollution because it
would exhaust the financial resources of the Insurers, whereas coverage for
accidental air pollution would be much more feasible. Any other approach to
such a market failure might cause the environmental insurance industry to
collapse. See Abraham, supra note 5.
"6 Obviously, market failures are more likely to be resolved not through
the courts but through government regulations, according to appropriate
policies including minimal conditions of a cognitive nature.
"' See supra note 125 for relevant examples.
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F. Summary
In summary, we can describe the hierarchy of rules for
insurance contract interpretation in the following manner:
The Interpretation against the Drafter rule indeed
constitutes a last-resort rule of interpretation but nonetheless is
the primary rule applicable whenever the text of an insurance
policy is ambiguous. Its application can involve a number of
complexities, subject to conditions such as those described above.
In any event, the rule will always entail a certain very intricate
degree of judicial discretion and therefore certainly cannot be
considered a rule that eliminates or restricts discretion.'
The Reasonable Expectations of the Insured test, on the
other hand, applies mainly when the text is clear and
unambiguous, although it might also act as a complement to the
Interpretation Against the Drafter' rule where the text is
ambiguous. Moreover, the test takes into account other
considerations besides merely the insured consumers' reasonable
expectations, such as the reasonable expectations the Insurers
themselves, and therefore can more accurately be called simply
the Reasonable Expectations test, without limiting the relevant
reasonable expectations to only those of the insured consumer. As
discussed above, the strategic location of this test within the
hierarchical interpretation model, whether in its role as a specific
doctrine or as a more abstract super-principle, can be seen as
lying at the level where courts examine the joint objective
purpose of the parties.
Thus, both substantively and procedurally, application of
the insurance contract interpretation model as a whole depends
on the Insurer's level of compliance with its duties of disclosure
and verification. As discussed above, compliance with these
duties of disclosure and verification may even make the rules of
interpretation superfluous because compliance with disclosure
focuses the court's attention on circumstances external to the text
and therefore bearing on both parties' subjective intent. As also
discussed above, however, the courts' limited ability to determine
the Insurer's actual level of compliance with its duties of
"' On the confidence of the public in Insurers, see sources cite supra note
56.

,,q Schwartz, supra note 2, at 62.
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disclosure ultimately leads the courts to resort to the rules of
interpretation after all in resolving disputes over insurance
contracts.
CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I presented and discussed the unique
interpretive doctrines that courts developed in the context of
insurance law. An important goal of mine was to highlight the
relationship between the insurer's duty of disclosure and the
interpretive approach of the courts. The interpretation of
insurance contracts is an intricate task that requires courts to
consider multiple factors. Chief among those, I have argued, is
the Insurer's level of compliance with its duty to disclose. I
demonstrated that although courts take into account the extent of
the Insurer's disclosure in resolving insurance disputes, they do
not give sufficient weight to this factor. Therefore, I proposed
modifications to the existing interpretive approach that would
make it more sensitive to this consideration. My proposed
modifications carry a promise for a more efficient and fairer
resolution of insurance conflicts and will therefore benefit both
the insurance industry and the Insureds as a group.

